We develop a principal-agent model based on a sequential game played by a representative investor and a fund manager in an asymmetric information framework. The model shows that investors' perceptions of the fund market play the key role in the fund's fee-setting mechanism. The managers' true...

We report strong evidence that changes of momentum, i.e. "acceleration", defined as the first difference of successive returns, provide better performance and higher explanatory power than momentum. The corresponding Γ-factor explains the momentum-sorted portfolios entirely but not the reverse....

We introduce a model for portfolio selection with an extendable investment universe where the agent faces a trade-off between exploiting existing and exploring for new investment opportunities. An agent with mean-variance preferences starts with an existing investment universe consisting of a...

We propose a dynamic Rational Expectations (RE) bubble model of prices with the intention to exploit it for and evaluate it on optimal investment strategies. Our bubble model is defined as a geometric Brownian motion combined with separate crash (and rally) discrete jump distributions associated...