A two-agent model of international trade with oligopoly and increasing returns is proposed to address why there have been persistent anti-trade-liberalization movements. It is shown that all of a country's residents lose from trade under certain conditions on the cross-country cost structure.

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

A two-agent model of international trade with oligopoly and increasing returns is proposed to address why there have been persistent anti-trade-liberalization movements. It is shown that all of a country's residents lose from trade under certain conditions on the cross-country cost structure.

We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis, while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a myopic profit maximizer at each...