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Mistaken self-perception and equilibrium

Squintani, Francesco - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 27 (2006) 3, pp. 615-641

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003277040

Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 56 (2014) 2, pp. 219-249

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362195

On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Qin, Cheng-zhong; Yang, Xintong - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 69 (2020) 4, pp. 1127-1146

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012240735

Bayesian games with a continuum of states

Hellman, Ziv; Levy, Yehuda John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1089-1120

We show that every Bayesian game with purely atomic types has a measurable Bayesian equilibrium when the common … equilibrium. We show that our smoothness condition also rules out two paradoxes involving Bayesian games with a continuum of types …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744122

Persuasion with unknown beliefs

Kosterina, Svetlana - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1075-1107

A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327114