Showing 1 - 10 of 145
In a laboratory experiment, the voluntary provision of public goods is investigated when there is probabilistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213788
Fischbacher and Gaechter (AER, 2010) find that contributions decline in repeatedly played public good games because people are imperfect conditional cooperators who match others' contributions only partly. We re-examine the data using dynamic panel data methods and find that contributions also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278589
Suppose a group of individuals must decide whether to undertake a public project. The private commodity space, from which are also drawn the inputs for the public good, exhibits the Riesz decomposition property. We give a sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible provision of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278800
There has been an extensive research literature on auctions, but recent developments in technology have resulted in new interest in auction mechanisms as a practical way of allocating resources. This paper presents a new double-auction mechanism to handle resource allocation for public goods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009218216
We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to upwards their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836134
We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to upwards their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181846
The private exchange of charitable gifts (e.g. charity gift-cards) has recently become an important source of donations to charities. In this paper we study this new phenomenon using the classical model of private provision of public goods, modified to account for exchange of private gifts....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734665
Many local public goods are provided in coalitions. When coalitions form they may have the power to exclude members. The core applies to such cases. When coalitions cannot exclude members, all who prefer the provided public good can join. The no-exodus equilibrium is proposed for such cases. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665526
This paper develops a model of legislative spending in which revenues can be spent through earmarks or a general fund. Legislative choice is modeled as a Baron and Ferejohn style legislative bargaining game. The novel approach is to model the bargaining process as a two-stage game reflecting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149965
This paper argues that the architecture of a codebase is a critical factor that lies at the heart of the open source development process. We define two observable properties of an architecture: (1) modularity and (2) option value. Developers can often make informed judgments about modularity and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191452