Investment in R&D is positively associated with the variance of sales growth and, to a lesser extent, employment growth. The magnitude of this effect has not increased in recent decades, however.

We construct a new database by matching firm-level Compustat data to NBER patent data, for four 2-digit complex technology sectors. Whilst conventional regression estimators show that the stock market does recognise efforts at innovation, quantile regression analysis adds a new dimension to the...

We construct a new database by matching firm-level Compustat data to NBER patent data, for four 2-digit complex technology sectors. Whilst conventional regression estimators show that the stock market does recognise efforts at innovation, quantile regression analysis adds a new dimension to the...

While Gibrat's Law assumes that growth rate variance is independent of size, empirical work has usually found a negative relationship between growth rate variance and firm growth. Using data on French manufacturing firms, we observe a relatively low, but statistically significant, negative...

While Gibrat's Law assumes that growth rate variance is independent of size, empirical work has usually found a negative relationship between growth rate variance and firm growth. Using data on French manufacturing firms, we observe a relatively low, but statistically significant, negative...

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

This paper shows how the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination may be decomposed into two effects: a misallocation effect and an output effect. It also presents a geometrical analysis which shows how the welfare properties of third-degree price discrimination must be assessed...

The strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing policy game is not, as stated...

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

This paper shows how the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination may be decomposed into two effects: a misallocation effect and an output effect. It also presents a geometrical analysis which shows how the welfare properties of third-degree price discrimination must be assessed...