This note shows that when products are complements in the mixed duopoly market, both public and private firms choose excess capacity. This contrasts with substitute case, where public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while private firm keeps holding excess capacity.

This note shows that when products are complements in the mixed duopoly market, both public and private firms choose excess capacity. This contrasts with substitute case, where public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while private firm keeps holding excess capacity.

Investment in R&D is positively associated with the variance of sales growth and, to a lesser extent, employment growth. The magnitude of this effect has not increased in recent decades, however.

We construct a new database by matching firm-level Compustat data to NBER patent data, for four 2-digit complex technology sectors. Whilst conventional regression estimators show that the stock market does recognise efforts at innovation, quantile regression analysis adds a new dimension to the...

We construct a new database by matching firm-level Compustat data to NBER patent data, for four 2-digit complex technology sectors. Whilst conventional regression estimators show that the stock market does recognise efforts at innovation, quantile regression analysis adds a new dimension to the...

While Gibrat's Law assumes that growth rate variance is independent of size, empirical work has usually found a negative relationship between growth rate variance and firm growth. Using data on French manufacturing firms, we observe a relatively low, but statistically significant, negative...

While Gibrat's Law assumes that growth rate variance is independent of size, empirical work has usually found a negative relationship between growth rate variance and firm growth. Using data on French manufacturing firms, we observe a relatively low, but statistically significant, negative...

We analyze the capacity choice of firms in a long-run mixed oligopoly market, in which firms decide not only production quantity but also capacity scale. Our main purpose is to show that while a profit-maximizing firm maintains over capacity as a strategic device, a firm pursuing non-pure profit...

This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the...

We analyze the capacity choice of firms in a long-run mixed oligopoly market, in which firms decide not only production quantity but also capacity scale. Our main purpose is to show that while a profit-maximizing firm maintains over capacity as a strategic device, a firm pursuing non-pure profit...