The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

This paper shows how the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination may be decomposed into two effects: a misallocation effect and an output effect. It also presents a geometrical analysis which shows how the welfare properties of third-degree price discrimination must be assessed...

The strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing policy game is not, as stated...

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

This paper shows how the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination may be decomposed into two effects: a misallocation effect and an output effect. It also presents a geometrical analysis which shows how the welfare properties of third-degree price discrimination must be assessed...