We study collusion between price discriminating firms which are asymmetrically located in a linear city. We obtain that higher distance increases the sustainability of the collusive agreement for any degree of spatial asymmetry, and more spatial symmetry between firms increases collusion...

We use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms' symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree.

We study the impact of product differentiation on collusion sustainability in the case of imperfect price discrimination and inelastic demand functions. We show that differentiation facilitates the sustainability of collusion. Therefore, the indifference result of Gupta and Venkatu (2002) does...

In a market characterized by network externalities, we consider a situation in which an established incumbent faces a new entrant: the differentiation degree chosen by the entrant increases with the network externalities, while the price set by the incumbent initially increases with the network...

A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee. However, when a commitment of no production is possible for the patent-holder, the result is reverted.

The unidirectional Hotelling model where consumers can buy only from firms located on their right (left) is extended to allow for price discriminating firms and a general class of transportation costs. In a two-stage location-price game one firm locates at 1/2 and the other locates at 1 (0). We...