We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the...

This paper studies capacity choice in a mixed duopoly with differentiated goods under quantity competition and price competition, taking into account the separation between ownership and management. In this paper, we show that in equilibrium, under quantity competition, both the public firm and...

We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the...

This paper investigates the bargaining between owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts, in order to explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes. We consider the managerial incentive contracts based on the profit and sales of...

We again examine how the managers' bargaining power affects social welfare and the firms'' profits in both quantity and price competition, in particular, in the case where each firm''s production technology is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that under both the competition...

This paper investigates the bargaining between owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts, in order to explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes. We consider the managerial incentive contracts based on the profit and sales of...

We again examine how the managers' bargaining power affects social welfare and the firms'' profits in both quantity and price competition, in particular, in the case where each firm''s production technology is represented by a quadratic cost function. We show that under both the competition...

This paper examines the bargaining problem between firms' owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts in a duopolistic market with differentiated-products. Assuming that delegated managers make every managerial decision in the market, we analyze how the managers'' bargaining...

It is proved that the irrelevance result of Poyago-Theotoky can be extended from the linear-quadratic case to general inverse demand and cost functions. Hence, as long as firms are profitable at the first-best, the optimal subsidy decentralizes it in mixed oligopoly irrespecitve of whether the...

This paper investigates productivity improving merger activities between a public firm and a private firm in mixed oligopoly. We assume that the merged firm has two plants (formerly, firms). We show that both owners of a public firm and a private firm want to merge by coordinating their...