In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model in which products are differentiated ”à la Hotelling”. We assumine that only one of the two firms faces a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of the unconstrained firm for the...

This note qualifies the statement made in Bouët (2001), European Economic Review 45, 323-336, by showing that within the model proposed by the author the effect of a VER on research and development does depend on the mode of competition

In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model in which products are differentiated â€à la Hotellingâ€. We assumine that only one of the two firms faces a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of the unconstrained firm for the...

It is proved that the irrelevance result of Poyago-Theotoky can be extended from the linear-quadratic case to general inverse demand and cost functions. Hence, as long as firms are profitable at the first-best, the optimal subsidy decentralizes it in mixed oligopoly irrespecitve of whether the...

This note qualifies the statement made in Bouët (2001), European Economic Review 45, 323-336, by showing that within the model proposed by the author the effect of a VER on research and development does depend on the mode of competition

It is proved that the irrelevance result of Poyago-Theotoky can be extended from the linear-quadratic case to general inverse demand and cost functions. Hence, as long as firms are profitable at the first-best, the optimal subsidy decentralizes it in mixed oligopoly irrespecitve of whether the...

White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) prove that in the mixed oligopoly the optimal subsidy, equilibrium output level, all firms' profits and social welfare are identical irrespective of whether the public firm maximizes welfare or profit and moves simultaneously with private...

White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) prove that in the mixed oligopoly the optimal subsidy, equilibrium output level, all firms' profits and social welfare are identical irrespective of whether the public firm maximizes welfare or profit and moves simultaneously with private...