This paper develops a model of legislative spending in which revenues can be spent through earmarks or a general fund. Legislative choice is modeled as a Baron and Ferejohn style legislative bargaining game. The novel approach is to model the bargaining process as a two-stage game reflecting the...

Many local public goods are provided in coalitions. When coalitions form they may have the power to exclude members. The core applies to such cases. When coalitions cannot exclude members, all who prefer the provided public good can join. The no-exodus equilibrium is proposed for such cases. It...

Individual subjects are experimentally tested for precautionary saving. We use a simplified experimental framework and decision supporting tool to show that subject's consumption is consistent with precautionary saving. We find that subjects overact in changing current income. However, those...

In Geng, Weiss, and Wolff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.