In this paper interval bankruptcy games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval claims are introduced. For this class of cooperative games two (marginal-based) Shapley-like values are considered and the relation between them is studied.

The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition...

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.

We show that the incompatibility between the Pareto principle and the notion of non-discrimination as presented in Xu (2000) continues to hold when the individuals have exact preferences and the social preference relation is allowed to be a reflexive and transitive fuzzy binary relation. Our...

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.

The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition...

In this paper interval bankruptcy games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval claims are introduced. For this class of cooperative games two (marginal-based) Shapley-like values are considered and the relation between them is studied.