We consider two-player integer allocation plms and provide axiomatic characterizations of adaptations of the Nash (1950) an Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solutions fo such problems. We also relate the theory dveloped for integer allocation problems, to the problem of fair allocation of indivisible...

In this paper we show that if all agents are equipped with discrete concave production functions, then a feasible price allocation pair is a market equilibrium if and only if it solves a linear programming problem, similar to, but perhaps simpler than the one invoked in Yang (2001). Using this...

We consider two-player integer allocation plms and provide axiomatic characterizations of adaptations of the Nash (1950) an Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solutions fo such problems. We also relate the theory dveloped for integer allocation problems, to the problem of fair allocation of indivisible...

We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of pair-wise envy free and stable matchings for two-sided systems with techniques.

This paper proves the existence of non-empty cores for directed network problems with quotas and for those combinatorial allocation problems which permit only exclusive allocations.

This paper proves the existence of non-empty cores for directed network problems with quotas and for those combinatorial allocation problems which permit only exclusive allocations.

We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of pair-wise envy free and stable matchings for two-sided systems with techniques.

In this paper we provide axiomatic chracterzations of the Liberal Rule and the Quota Rule for voting problems where the consent of the candidate is also a factor determining whether the candidate is selected or not.