The equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) can be expressed as the sum of both "internal dividends" and "external losses" for a given transferable utility (TU) game.

The equal allocation of nonseparable costs (EANSC) can be expressed as the sum of both "internal dividends" and "external losses" for a given transferable utility (TU) game.

In the framework of interval games, we show that the Shapley value is the unique solution satisfying efficiency, symmetry and coalitional strategic equivalence.

In this note we link the solutions for multi-choice games proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), and Peters and Zank (2005) with the Shapley values of some particular TU games.

In this note we show that on the domain of fuzzy NTU games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and the reduced game property.

In bankruptcy problems we characterize the random arrival rule by means of CG-consistency and population monotonicity.

We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of dominance core and a necessary and sufficient condition for coincidence of the core and the dominance core to the setting of multi-choice games.

In this note we link the solutions for multi-choice games proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), and Peters and Zank (2005) with the Shapley values of some particular TU games.

In this note we show that on the domain of fuzzy NTU games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and the reduced game property.

We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of dominance core and a necessary and sufficient condition for coincidence of the core and the dominance core to the setting of multi-choice games.