Most of the developing nations are still struggling for efficient use of their resources. In order to overcome physical and administrative constraints of the development, it is necessary to transfer the power from the central government to local authorities. Distribution of power from improves...

Are the Scandinavian countries more redistributive than the US? Given the impression of Scandinavian egalitarianism one may conjecture that they redistribute more, but there is not irrefutable support for this in the literature. In general, the relationship between income inequality and...

This paper analyzes the governmentÂfs choice of three proportional tax bases (a consumption tax, a wage tax and a capital income tax) and its influence on the steady-state levels of capital accumulation and social welfare under fiscal federalism and the unitary system. We report two main...

This paper analyzes the government's choice of three proportional tax bases (a consumption tax, a wage tax and a capital income tax) and its influence on the steady-state levels of capital accumulation and social welfare under fiscal federalism and the unitary system. We report two main...

An autocrat who is politically insecure may not invest in income-enhancing goods like education, roads, the rule of law, etc. The novelty of this paper is to argue that ethnic diversity and discrimination exacerbate an autocrat's fear of the negative effect of high income or income-enhancing...

An autocrat who is politically insecure may not invest in income-enhancing goods like education, roads, the rule of law, etc. The novelty of this paper is to argue that ethnic diversity and discrimination exacerbate an autocrat's fear of the negative effect of high income or income-enhancing...

This paper presents an analysis on capital accumulation and social welfare in fiscal federalism and the unitary system by using an overlapping generations model. We introduce three possible cases pertaining to how government tax policy towards individuals could be formulated: the government...

In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and...

This paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill-model of optimal income taxation.

This paper constructs a multi-region endogenous growth model with productive government spending to examine vertical intergovernmental relationship. Specifically, we analyze the contribution of fiscal decentralization on the optimal tax rates of national and local taxes and on the economic...