We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated version of a standard auction with a continuum of types. Because of the lack of efficiency results in this setting the literature has focused on determining and comparing benchmarks on how well bidders can collude. Aoyagi (2003) has shown that the...

We show that the result on the existence of a unique Nash perfect equilibrium in two-bidder multi-unit sequential second-price auctions under complete information (as in Krishna, 1993; Katzman, 1999; and Gale and Stegeman, 2001) is not robust in higher dimensional auctions. Using an example featuring...

We study the limitations of the general space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and two nonidentical items. Our model has multidimensional types, private values, nonnegative...

This paper investigates implications of some of the well-known behavioral biases of bidders' behavior in different types of auctions. It presents the results of an experimental study that tests the endowment hypothesis for English auctions and regret aversion hypothesis for first-price...

We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price...

Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a...

The theory of equalising differences recognises that wage differentials may be required to equalise the attractiveness of alternative occupations. We examine this theory using the Conley/Wooders 'crowding types'' model. The crowding types model distinguishes between the tastes of a player and...

A simple common value auction is considered where it is optimal to set a ceiling price in addition to a reserve price. The ceiling price prevents the better informed bidder from outbidding the less informed bidders. This guarantees participation from the less informed bidders raising the...

A simple common value auction is considered where it is optimal to set a ceiling price in addition to a reserve price. The ceiling price prevents the better informed bidder from outbidding the less informed bidders. This guarantees participation from the less informed bidders raising the...

This article considers a model of spatial competition where firms and consumers are located in a semicircular space rather than in the whole circle (Salop's model) or the linear city (Hotelling's model), under the assumptions of both, convex and concave, transportation costs. The paper tries to...