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The Power of an Outside Option that Generates a Focal Point: An Experimental Investigation
Shahriar, Quazi - In: Economics Bulletin 31 (2011) 3, pp. 2151-2158
Existing experimental studies (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, 1993; Shahriar, 2009) have shown that an outside option, when offered to one of the two players who later participate in a battle-of-the-sexes game, makes the equilibrium that favors the same player focal. This focal point arises even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278681
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Common and almost common knowledge of credible assignments in a coordination game
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Zhou, Chenan; Prak, Parapin; … - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2006) 1, pp. 1-10
-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094760
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Common and almost common knowledge of credible assignments in a coordination game
Chaudhuri, Ananish; Zhou, Chenan; Prak, Parapin; … - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2006) 1, pp. 1-10
-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629213
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An experimental study of e-mail games with strategic information transmission and communication cost
Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2921-2929
Rubinstein's model by replacing automatic information transmission with the strategic one, or by introducing communication costs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278536
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Do I care if you know I betrayed you?
Cox, James C; Li, Danyang - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2839-2848
In this paper, we report results derived from a laboratory experiment based on a modifed trust game. We introduced a coin flip between decisions of trustors and trustees in the trust game. The realized outcome of the coin flip determines the productivity of trust. By varying trustors' ability to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278628
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Efficiency in Bargaining Games with Alternating Offers
Sadiraj, Vjollca; Sun, Juan - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 3, pp. 2366-2374
Bargaining games model situations in which the realization of potential benefits is jeopardized by conflicting bargaining powers. Most of the literature on bargaining behavior focuses on bargaining over gains. Exploration of behavior in situations under which agents bargain over losses has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278802
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Coordination failure caused by sunspots
Beugnot, Julie; Gürgüç, Zeynep; Øvlisen, Frederik Roose - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2860-2869
In a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria, we study whether a sunspot can lead to either coordination on an … inferior equilibrium (mis-coordination) or to out-of equilibrium behavior (dis-coordination). While much of the literature … searches for mechanisms to attain coordination on the efficient equilibrium, we consider sunspots as a potential reason for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278878
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Comparing Guessing Games with homogeneous and heterogeneous players: Experimental results and a CH explanation
Kovac, Eugen; Vojtek, Martin; Ortmann, Andreas - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2008) 9, pp. 1-9
We investigate the decisions of individuals in simple and complex environments. We use a version of the Guessing Game (Beauty-contest Game) as a vehicle for our investigation, employing mathematically talented students. We find that our subjects think in complex environments more carefully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835751
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An Experiment on Waiting Time and Punishing Behavior
Galeotti, Fabio - In: Economics Bulletin 33 (2013) 2, pp. 1383-1389
We investigate the implications of waiting time on the decision to punish in a power-to-take experiment. We find that (a) waiting reduces the overall probability of destroying and (b) responders destroy more often in response to higher take rates when the waiting time is longer.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835937
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Drift and equilibrium selection with human and computer players
Ricciuti, Roberto; Innocenti, Alessandro; Caminati, Mauro - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2008) 19, pp. 1-7
The theory of drift (Binmore and Samuelson 1999) concerns equilibrium selection in which second-order disturbances may have first-order effects in the emergence of one equilibrium over the other. We provided experimental evidence with human players supporting the model in Caminati, Innocenti and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835981