An interesting feature of pollution permit markets is that citizens may purchase permits to directly lower the levels of pollution. Kwerel's mechanism (Review of Economic Studies~1977) is not incentive compatible when citizens demand permits. We show that a modification of Kwerel''s mechainism,...

This paper investigates the optimal partial privatization of a Stackelberg leader in a mixed oligopoly. It builds from Matsumura's duopoly Cournot model (1998) by comparing Cournot and Stackelberg models. In Cournot, partial ownership is optimal in a duopoly. In Stackelberg, partial...

This book introduces new theoretical foundations under uncertainty with applications.

This paper shows that increasing the sanction on collective crime may increase its prevalence. This situation arises when individuals can commit crimes both individually and as part of a collective. Our result is based on an interdependence between detection probabilities where detection of an...

This book introduces new theoretical foundations under uncertainty with applications (Nova Science Publishers Inc., NY, 2007).

In the popular FOX TV reality show, American Idol, the judges, who are presumably experts in evaluating singing effort, have no voting power when the field is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants. It is only the votes of viewers that count. In the 2007 season of the show, one of the...

The economics of paintings and sculpture have extensively been analysed, but the literature records no application to photography. This article estimates a hedonic model to relate the prices of auctioned photographs to their attributes. Our model explains 53 percent of variations across...

This paper confronts the tractability problems that accompany IPV auction models with multi-unit bidder demands. Utilizing a first order approach, the asymptotic properties of symmetric equilibria in discriminatory and uniform price auctions are derived. It is shown that as the number of bidders...

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. With convexity of the payoff set of the grand coalition, we show that (1) a game with limited side payments has a nonempty epsilon-core and (2) when some degree of...

The economic behaviors manifested between professors and students may be viewed as a game, with both behaviors endogenously correlated. In this paper, a static game is applied to address this behavior and determine the Nash equilibrium. Both professors and students choose their best strategies...