I introduce uncertainty into the model of strategic cost-reducing R and D investments and reexamine welfare implications. I discuss two models. In one model an increase in expenditure decreases production costs when R\&D succeeds, and in the other model it increases probability of success. I...

We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (or spatial price discrimination model) with a linear city. First, we extend a delivered pricing duopoly with Bertrand competition of Hamilton et al. (1989) to an n-firm model and explicitly solve...

We apply a spatial model that includes both circular-city and linear-city models as special cases to the analysis of location-quantity model in mixed oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium pattern continuously moves from that of the circular-city to that of the linear-city and that the...

I introduce uncertainty into the model of strategic cost-reducing R and D investments and reexamine welfare implications. I discuss two models. In one model an increase in expenditure decreases production costs when R\&D succeeds, and in the other model it increases probability of success. I...

This paper investigates a location-quantity model in a circular city. Pal (1998) investigates a duopoly model and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium. Matsushima (2001a) investigates an n-firm oligopoly model and shows that, if the number of firms is even, another...

This paper investigates a location-quantity model in a circular city. Pal (1998) investigates a duopoly model and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium. Matsushima (2001a) investigates an n-firm oligopoly model and shows that, if the number of firms is even, another...

This paper presents a two-country model of duopolistic market with vertical relations which leads to a paradoxical result: when upstream firms possess sufficient bargaining power, cost-reducing FDI may actually enhance the rival firm's profit.

This paper presents a two-country model of duopolistic market with vertical relations which leads to a paradoxical result: when upstream firms possess sufficient bargaining power, cost-reducing FDI may actually enhance the rival firm's profit.