In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model in which products are differentiated ”à la Hotelling”. We assumine that only one of the two firms faces a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of the unconstrained firm for the...

This note qualifies the statement made in Bouët (2001), European Economic Review 45, 323-336, by showing that within the model proposed by the author the effect of a VER on research and development does depend on the mode of competition

In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model in which products are differentiated â€à la Hotellingâ€. We assumine that only one of the two firms faces a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of the unconstrained firm for the...

This note qualifies the statement made in Bouët (2001), European Economic Review 45, 323-336, by showing that within the model proposed by the author the effect of a VER on research and development does depend on the mode of competition

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.