A two-agent model of international trade with oligopoly and increasing returns is proposed to address why there have been persistent anti-trade-liberalization movements. It is shown that all of a country's residents lose from trade under certain conditions on the cross-country cost structure.

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

A two-agent model of international trade with oligopoly and increasing returns is proposed to address why there have been persistent anti-trade-liberalization movements. It is shown that all of a country's residents lose from trade under certain conditions on the cross-country cost structure.

We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis, while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a myopic profit maximizer at each...

Developing a two-country model of international mixed oligopoly, this note makes clear the determinant of trade patterns. We give a simple formula to predict bilateral patterns of trade which relates the degree of a country's privatization and the trading country''s competitiveness. If a...

Developing a two-country model of international mixed oligopoly, this note makes clear the determinant of trade patterns. We give a simple formula to predict bilateral patterns of trade which relates the degree of a country's privatization and the trading country''s competitiveness. If a...

We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis, while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a myopic profit maximizer at each...

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework,...

Applying Atkeson and Kehoe's (2000) dynamic model to the dynamic Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin approach, we examine the role of the timing of development (e.g., the removal of trade barriers) as a determinant of trade patterns.

We examine the role of radical international differences in preferences in determining patterns of international trade, given that the trading countries share a common technology and identical factor endowment ratios. It is characteristic of our model that the equilibrium autarkic commodity...