This paper offers a solution to King Solomon's problem of allocating an indivisible "prize" to two agents. We add time dimension to the original space of outcomes and construct a static mechanism similar to the one used in virtual implementation. The implementation is imminent: the mechanism...

This paper offers a solution to King Solomon's problem of allocating an indivisible "prize" to two agents. We add time dimension to the original space of outcomes and construct a static mechanism similar to the one used in virtual implementation. The implementation is imminent: the mechanism...

Assuming that oligopolistic downstream firms take intermediate goods prices as given and that upstream and integrated firms choose their quantities first and simultaneously, this note shows that vertical mergers between upstream and downstream firms are procompetitive.

Assuming that oligopolistic downstream firms take intermediate goods prices as given and that upstream and integrated firms choose their quantities first and simultaneously, this note shows that vertical mergers between upstream and downstream firms are procompetitive.