In this note we reappraise the measure of the importance of time-dependent price setting rules suggested by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005, "State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pricing: Does It Matter for Recent U.S. Inflation?," Bank of Canada Working Paper 05-4). Furthermore, we propose an...

This paper examines the impact of transaction costs on the social efficiency of first-degree price discrimination. Price discrimination requires the producer to expend resources and compels consumers to incur costs. The consideration of producer and consumer transaction costs alters the...

This paper examines how Bertrand competition affects the welfare implications of bundling by a multi-product firm, which is a monopoly over one good and faces a single-product competitor in a second good. We find that the equilibrium bundle price is lower than the sum of the prices of the two...

In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to...

This paper analyzes a Stackelberg model where firms choose their objective functions (profit or revenue) in order to achieve maximum payoff. The objective of the present work is to demonstrate that depending on the unit cost of production, firms make either asymmetric choices of objectives (low...

We study collusion between price discriminating firms which are asymmetrically located in a linear city. We obtain that higher distance increases the sustainability of the collusive agreement for any degree of spatial asymmetry, and more spatial symmetry between firms increases collusion...

I introduce uncertainty into the model of strategic cost-reducing R and D investments and reexamine welfare implications. I discuss two models. In one model an increase in expenditure decreases production costs when R\&D succeeds, and in the other model it increases probability of success. I...

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

We study the relation between a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilibrium in an emph{asymmetric} duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit that is the difference between its profit and the profit of the rival firm. Both demand and cost functions are...

This paper studies the incentive by a single firm in a differentiated goods duopoly to engage in cost-reducing innovations and how this incentive is affected by the level of competition in the product market. It is found that a firm's innovation effort has a U-shaped relationship with the level...