I introduce uncertainty into the model of strategic cost-reducing R and D investments and reexamine welfare implications. I discuss two models. In one model an increase in expenditure decreases production costs when R\&D succeeds, and in the other model it increases probability of success. I...

I introduce uncertainty into the model of strategic cost-reducing R and D investments and reexamine welfare implications. I discuss two models. In one model an increase in expenditure decreases production costs when R\&D succeeds, and in the other model it increases probability of success. I...

This paper investigates a location-quantity model in a circular city. Pal (1998) investigates a duopoly model and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium. Matsushima (2001a) investigates an n-firm oligopoly model and shows that, if the number of firms is even, another...

This paper investigates a location-quantity model in a circular city. Pal (1998) investigates a duopoly model and finds that an equidistant location pattern appears in equilibrium. Matsushima (2001a) investigates an n-firm oligopoly model and shows that, if the number of firms is even, another...

We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (or spatial price discrimination model) with a linear city. First, we extend a delivered pricing duopoly with Bertrand competition of Hamilton et al. (1989) to an n-firm model and explicitly solve...

We apply a spatial model that includes both circular-city and linear-city models as special cases to the analysis of location-quantity model in mixed oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium pattern continuously moves from that of the circular-city to that of the linear-city and that the...

This paper presents a two-country model of duopolistic market with vertical relations which leads to a paradoxical result: when upstream firms possess sufficient bargaining power, cost-reducing FDI may actually enhance the rival firm's profit.

This paper presents a two-country model of duopolistic market with vertical relations which leads to a paradoxical result: when upstream firms possess sufficient bargaining power, cost-reducing FDI may actually enhance the rival firm's profit.