A seller seeking to sell an indivisible object can post (possibly different) prices to each of n buyers. Buyers' valuations are private information and drawn independently from the same distribution. If the seller can choose who to sell to in the event there are several willing buyers, her...

Under a specific informational framework, we compare the seller's expected revenue from a first-price auction and a second-price auction when bidders are risk averse and have private affiliated values.

This paper examines the effect of demand uncertainty on the properties of the first period contract between a lender and the incumbent, when there is a threat of entry. The main findings are that unlike the cost uncertainty case, entry has no effect on the incumbent's incentives and it leads the...

This paper makes three contributions: (1) A competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. Specifically, given any profile of incentive compatible indirect contracting mechanisms, there exists an incentive compatible...

Can software piracy be profitable for a software editor? We tackle this issue in a simple model where software is an experience good and where the potential users can choose to adopt or pirate software or to delay their adoption. In that context, we show that a moderate piracy can be profitable...

A seller seeking to sell an indivisible object can post (possibly different) prices to each of n buyers. Buyers' valuations are private information and drawn independently from the same distribution. If the seller can choose who to sell to in the event there are several willing buyers, her...

We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density. This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive...

We study information disclosure in standard auctions where bidders preferences are horizontally differentiated, whose valuations depend on the matching between the product attribute and their preferences. The seller may reveal product information in the form of partition prior to the auction....

We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a two-stage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.

We study a loan market equilibrium in which some borrowers are optimistic and banks face imperfect competition. We show that the presence of optimistic borrowers reduces the interest rate paid by safe borrowers and increases the interest rate paid by risky borrowers. But it has no net impact on...