A procedure to construct a social welfare function from a social choice function is suggested and it is shown that the dictatorial are the only unanimous social welfare functions that can be reconstructed from a social choice function that does not change the social choice when a defeated...

In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.

We consider two-player integer allocation plms and provide axiomatic characterizations of adaptations of the Nash (1950) an Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solutions fo such problems. We also relate the theory dveloped for integer allocation problems, to the problem of fair allocation of indivisible...

In the popular FOX TV reality show, American Idol, the judges, who are presumably experts in evaluating singing effort, have no voting power when the field is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants. It is only the votes of viewers that count. In the 2007 season of the show, one of the...

The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we explore how the power of elections as a selection device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents.

This paper shows an impossibility result similar to the liberal paradox concerning two games, each of one with an efficient Nash equilibrium. We show that our result holds also in dictatorial games.

This article analyzes the dynamics of electoral promises towards the population and interest groups, focusing on the reaction of voters to the proximity of a candidate to interests groups. In a two-period electoral competition model, we show that a (re)election seeking politician must consider...

This work presents a review of the literature on political process formation and the role of institutions on economic development. Models of citizen candidacy and candidate choice and equilibria under plurality rule elections are illustrated. Studies of the relation between institutional...

We consider that in a society, there are conflicts of income redistribution between the rich (class) and the poor (one), and the extent of income inequality s conflict between these two groups in the society, bringing to a revolution aimed for more redistribution. In our model, we assume that...

The distribution of indivisible good in a society has social implications on individual behavior. In this paper, I present a model of choice which permit the quantification of the sense of impartiality. This model has implication in the choice of a winner of an indivisible good among a group of...