This paper examines the effect of demand uncertainty on the properties of the first period contract between a lender and the incumbent, when there is a threat of entry. The main findings are that unlike the cost uncertainty case, entry has no effect on the incumbent's incentives and it leads the...

This paper makes three contributions: (1) A competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. Specifically, given any profile of incentive compatible indirect contracting mechanisms, there exists an incentive compatible...

Can software piracy be profitable for a software editor? We tackle this issue in a simple model where software is an experience good and where the potential users can choose to adopt or pirate software or to delay their adoption. In that context, we show that a moderate piracy can be profitable...

A seller seeking to sell an indivisible object can post (possibly different) prices to each of n buyers. Buyers' valuations are private information and drawn independently from the same distribution. If the seller can choose who to sell to in the event there are several willing buyers, her...

We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density. This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive...

We study information disclosure in standard auctions where bidders preferences are horizontally differentiated, whose valuations depend on the matching between the product attribute and their preferences. The seller may reveal product information in the form of partition prior to the auction....

Under a specific informational framework, we compare the seller's expected revenue from a first-price auction and a second-price auction when bidders are risk averse and have private affiliated values.

A seller seeking to sell an indivisible object can post (possibly different) prices to each of n buyers. Buyers' valuations are private information and drawn independently from the same distribution. If the seller can choose who to sell to in the event there are several willing buyers, her...

In this note, we consider a multisector macroeconomic model under oligopolistic competition. We analyze the effect of an increase of the number of sectors on equilibrium price and on allocations, when the number of oligopolits of each type is constant. We also show that a tax policy has more...

In this note, we examine how trade liberalization affects the profits of firms in the presence of network effects. We will show that, contrary to conclusions in the previous literature, trade liberalization between identical countries increases firms' profits despite intesified competition.