This paper analyses the stability of bargaining solutions in a family consisting of two parents and one adult child, by developing a non-cooperative family game. Assuming different bargaining powers between parents and the child, we find that the greater bargaining power of the parents allows...

This paper models interdependences between spouses. To that end, it estimates income satisfaction in a collective family model framework using a sample of seven EU countries. The IV Hausman-Taylor estimator has been selected in the majority of countries, and it appears that those of Southern...

This paper models interdependences between spouses. To that end, it estimates income satisfaction in a collective family model framework using a sample of seven EU countries. The IV Hausman-Taylor estimator has been selected in the majority of countries, and it appears that those of Southern...

This paper analyses the stability of bargaining solutions in a family consisting of two parents and one adult child, by developing a non-cooperative family game. Assuming different bargaining powers between parents and the child, we find that the greater bargaining power of the parents allows...