This paper provides a simple general equilibrium model with productive public spending and distorting taxes. The optimal conditions for the provision of public inputs are obtained under different tax systems. Also we discuss which factors affect the marginal cost of public funds.

A new method of empirically computing the macroeconomic returns to public investment is proposed. Pereira's (2000) technique is modified, and a measure which accounts for both public and private investment costs is suggested. An empirical application to US data shows that differences between...

This paper provides a simple general equilibrium model with productive public spending and distorting taxes. The optimal conditions for the provision of public inputs are obtained under different tax systems. Also we discuss which factors affect the marginal cost of public funds.

A new method of empirically computing the macroeconomic returns to public investment is proposed. Pereira's (2000) technique is modified, and a measure which accounts for both public and private investment costs is suggested. An empirical application to US data shows that differences between...

Fischbacher and Gaechter (AER, 2010) find that contributions decline in repeatedly played public good games because people are imperfect conditional cooperators who match others' contributions only partly. We re-examine the data using dynamic panel data methods and find that contributions also...

Suppose a group of individuals must decide whether to undertake a public project. The private commodity space, from which are also drawn the inputs for the public good, exhibits the Riesz decomposition property. We give a sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible provision of the...

We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to upwards their contribution during a fixed time interval. Experimental evidence shows that subjects increase their contributions in order to finance the cost of the good. The public good is...

We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to upwards their contribution during a fixed time interval. Experimental evidence shows that subjects increase their contributions in order to finance the cost of the good. The public good is...

This paper develops a model of legislative spending in which revenues can be spent through earmarks or a general fund. Legislative choice is modeled as a Baron and Ferejohn style legislative bargaining game. The novel approach is to model the bargaining process as a two-stage game reflecting the...

The siting of public facilities such as prisons or waste disposal facilities typically faces rejection by local populations (the "NIMBY" syndrome, for Not In My BackYard). These public goods exhibit a private bad aspect creating an asymmetry: all involved communities benefit from their...