This paper constructs an entry and code-sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the...

This paper constructs an entry and code-sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the...

This paper provides estimates of the elasticities of demand for the Brazilian basic plan of local fixed telephony using a cointegration model. We find a long-run price elasticity of –0.24, and an income elasticity of 0.18. These figures are line with other countries' estimates.

Coupled with the early wave of privatization in the 80s of state-owned telecom enterprises, the reform trend in the telecom market has shifted toward the market liberalization since the 90s, resulting in extended multilateral negotiations on the introduction of competition into basic...

Kang, Weisman, and Zhang (2000) demonstrated that, under a tighter price cap, consumer welfare increases with the independence of demands. Conversely, the tighter price cap may negatively impact consumer welfare in situations involving interdependent demands. This paper identifies an overlooked...

I derive Ramsey optimal prices in one-way access of long-distance operators and enhanced service providers to local loops. As long-distance services and enhanced services become substitutes due to the advance of Internet telephony, the Ramsey principle requires higher access charges assessed on...

Coupled with the early wave of privatization in the 80s of state-owned telecom enterprises, the reform trend in the telecom market has shifted toward the market liberalization since the 90s, resulting in extended multilateral negotiations on the introduction of competition into basic...

This paper provides estimates of the elasticities of demand for the Brazilian basic plan of local fixed telephony using a cointegration model. We find a long-run price elasticity of –0.24, and an income elasticity of 0.18. These figures are line with other countries' estimates.

Kang, Weisman, and Zhang (2000) demonstrated that, under a tighter price cap, consumer welfare increases with the independence of demands. Conversely, the tighter price cap may negatively impact consumer welfare in situations involving interdependent demands. This paper identifies an overlooked...

To increase competition in local telephone markets, the 1996 Telecommunications Act required incumbent firms to lease important inputs to competitors at regulated prices. Defending this so-called stepping-stone hypothesis, the Federal Communications Commission argued that new entrants needed a...