We study multiunit uniform price auctions where the seller is allowed to decrease the quantity supplied in order to maximize his profit. We show that he never chooses to do so in equilibrium. However, the existence of this option eliminates such equilibria where objects for sale are sold for too...

This paper analyzes an Easley and O'Hara (1992) type sequential trading model in an evolutionary setting. We assume that the memory of a market maker is limited, and that traders endogenously choose whether to acquire private information with a fixed cost. We show that the ratio of the informed...

This paper analyzes an Easley and O'Hara (1992) type sequential trading model in an evolutionary setting. We assume that the memory of a market maker is limited, and that traders endogenously choose whether to acquire private information with a fixed cost. We show that the ratio of the informed...

This paper confronts the tractability problems that accompany IPV auction models with multi-unit bidder demands. Utilizing a first order approach, the asymptotic properties of symmetric equilibria in discriminatory and uniform price auctions are derived. It is shown that as the number of bidders...

The purpose of this paper is to re-examine whether mean reversion property hold for 15 emerging stock markets for the period 1985 to 2006. Utilizing a panel stationarity test that is able to account for multiple structural breaks and cross sectional dependence, we find that the emerging stock...

The paper analyzes a Cournot model with two types of firms: Maximizers of profits and maximizers of relative payoffs. It is shown that the equilibrium is located somewhere between the regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the competitive Walrasian (or Bertrand-) equilibrium.

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

This article considers a model of spatial competition where firms and consumers are located in a semicircular space rather than in the whole circle (Salop's model) or the linear city (Hotelling's model), under the assumptions of both, convex and concave, transportation costs. The paper tries to...

This paper studies the question of entry in the circular city model when the pre-entry market structure involves local monopolies. In contrast with Salop (1979), we show that the unit profit rate of incumbent monopolists is strictly positive and bounded above. The upper bound decreases with the...

In this note we examine four standard multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in the presence of synergy. The structure of the equilibrium bidding strategy under each rule is quite intuitive. Whether the equilibrium involves "bundle-bidding" or "separating-bidding" strategy depends on the presence of the...