This paper experimentally investigates the effect of limits on campaign expenditure and outcome in an electoral contest where two candidates, an incumbent and a challenger, compete for office in terms of the amount of campaign expenditure. The candidates are asymmetric only in that the incumbent...

We build on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) and examine the efficacy of credible assignments in a stag-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of our subjects fail to coordinate to the payoff dominant...

We explore facets of conditional cooperation in a public goods game. First, we replicate the Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) result that the majority of subjects in public goods experiments are conditional cooperators. Next, given that the majority of subjects in our study are conditional...

We introduce a novel beauty contest experiment to study the gap between individual preferences and beliefs about collective preferences of physical attractiveness. In the first round, participants vote their 3 favorite ladies in the second round they vote the 3 ladies they believe were the most...

We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive-compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players'' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this...

Keizer et al. (2008) explore disorderly settings linked to a process of spreading norm violation. The results show that if norm violating behavior becomes more common, it negatively affects compliance in other areas. This comment addresses problematic areas in their studies and provides new...

We study learning in a simulated tournament using an inter-generational framework. Here a group of subjects are recruited into the lab and play the stage game for 10 rounds. After his participation is over, each player is replaced by another player, his laboratory descendant, who then plays the...

We experimentally examined several versions of Rubinstein (1989)'s e-mail game in the laboratory. He shows that, in the unique equilibrium of this game, players behave as if no information is exchanged, no matter how many messages are successfully sent. This has been regarded as a "paradox of...

In this paper, we report results derived from a laboratory experiment based on a modifed trust game. We introduced a coin flip between decisions of trustors and trustees in the trust game. The realized outcome of the coin flip determines the productivity of trust. By varying trustors' ability to...