In this paper we solve a parametric moral hazard model that incorporates risk and inequity aversion. In the model, the worker's effort is not contractible but the employer can link the worker's compensation to the revenue, a measure probabilistically related to the effort. The model can account...

The free-riding issue is generally considered to be the biggest obstacle in the success of an international environmental agreement. Even without free-riding incentives, however, asymmetric information can pose a potentially significant threat in establishing a cooperative relationship. In this...

This paper aims at establishing a relationship between disparity of information and the probability of speculative attack in explaining the Asian crisis. We apply the general framework of Markov-Switching models to the differential of interest rates (DIR), subsequently in Indonesia and Malaysia....

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

The free-riding issue is generally considered to be the biggest obstacle in the success of an international environmental agreement. Even without free-riding incentives, however, asymmetric information can pose a potentially significant threat in establishing a cooperative relationship. In this...

In this paper we show that differential commodity taxation is superfluous in an economy with moral hazard and separable preferences.

Machina (2007) formulates a number of experiments, and shows that they can be used to test the Choquet expected utility model. We show that one of them can also be used to test the class of maxmin expected utility preferences in Klibanoff (2001). Those preferences are not consistent with Choquet...

This work extends Lazear and Rosen's seminal paper to evaluate the performance of rank order tournaments when agents perform multiple tasks and the principal chooses, together with the prize spread, the weights assigned to each task in determining aggregate performance of each agent. All...

The joint liability literature claims that positive assortative matching, or risk homogeneity, is always the first best solution. We examine this claim in presence of group formation costs and find that the assertion is not always true.

Applying a standard questionnaire (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977) to a sample of 44 professional investors, we sought for explicit correlations between selected biological characteristics of the investors and the cognitive bias known as overconfidence. We found that both male and female...