Following the recent generalization of social choice in the literature on judgment aggregation, we extend the analysis of freedom of choice from sets of alternatives to sets of opinions. We establish the analogue of the cardinality based freedom of choice measure and suggest an alternative...

We present a straightforward proof of Arrow's Theorem. Our approach avoids some of the complexities of existing proofs and is meant to be transparent and easily followed.

The point of departure of this paper is that players in a contest may have mixed motives. On one hand, players have the interest of winning the contest and taking the prize. On the other hand, they could be better off taking part in a contest which implies some cooperative behaviour. This paper...

This paper explores the introduction of a variable critical-level in a variable population context. We focus the attention on the Critical- Level Leximin criterion, a social evaluation procedure which compares two social states as follows: (i) It reproduces the Leximin criterion when applied to...

We axiomatize the collective identity function selecting the agents that are indirectly designated by all the individuals in the society.

We consider the problem of allocating several units of an indivisible object among agents with single-peaked utility functions. We introduce an axiom called equal probability for the best, and show that it is equivalent to both equal treatment of equals and symmetry in the presence of Pareto...

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.

The distribution of indivisible good in a society has social implications on individual behavior. In this paper, I present a model of choice which permit the quantification of the sense of impartiality. This model has implication in the choice of a winner of an indivisible good among a group of...

This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen''s liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu''s arguments for taking...

This note shows that results similar to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem can be proved by replacing the weak Pareto principle by a weaker condition called Pareto Neutrality and used by Xu (1990) to state another version of Sen''s liberal paradox. Our result strengthens Xu''s arguments for taking...