This note proposes a graphical approach useful in game theory. This method consists in representing incentives to move strategically to graphical areas. The method can be used on several occasions we apply it as an example to the model of Bouët (2001).

Within the context of games on networks S. Goyal (Goyal (2007), pg. 39) posed the following problem. Under any arbitrary but fixed topology, does there exist at least one pure Nash equilibrium that exhibits a positive relation between the cardinality of a player's set of neighbors and its...

This note proposes a graphical approach useful in game theory. This method consists in representing incentives to move strategically to graphical areas. The method can be used on several occasions we apply it as an example to the model of Bouët (2001).

This paper uses dynamic games with complete and perfect information in solution of water conflict in Central Asia. The benefits and costs of the countries for their actions are modelled as payoffs for decision-makers within the frame of game theory concept. The equilibrium increasing the...

Condorcet's paradox is one of the most prominent results in social choice theory. It says that there may not exist any alternative that a net majority prefers over every other alternative. When outcomes need not be deterministic alternatives, we show that a similar paradox still exists even if...

We experimentally examined several versions of Rubinstein (1989)'s e-mail game in the laboratory. He shows that, in the unique equilibrium of this game, players behave as if no information is exchanged, no matter how many messages are successfully sent. This has been regarded as a "paradox of...

We analyze a simple decentralized matching mechanism in market with couples called One Application Mechanism. Under this mechanism any stable matching of the market can be attained in Subgame Perfect equilibrium (SPE). In contrast with previous results, we find that the mechanism may attain...

In this comment, we show that the existence of the preemption equilibrium in Fudenberg and Tirole (Review of Economics Studies, vol. 52, PP. 383-401, 1985)'s continuous-time games of timing is not guaranteed under their assumptions.

In this note we investigate the Shapley value for fuzzy games proposed by Hwang and Liao (2009). We show that there exists a transferable-utility (TU) decomposition games that can be adopted to characterize the fuzzy Shapley value, i.e., the fuzzy Shapley value consists of the Shapley value of...

We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution...