This paper investigates the effects of exclusive territories in the presence of upstream competition. We consider the vertical dealings among two upstream firms and four downstream firms and find that exclusive territories may be more beneficial for consumers and more harmful for producers than...

The unidirectional Hotelling model where consumers can buy only from firms located on their right (left) is extended to allow for price discriminating firms and a general class of transportation costs. In a two-stage location-price game one firm locates at 1/2 and the other locates at 1 (0). We...

This paper investigates the effects of exclusive territories in the presence of upstream competition. We consider the vertical dealings among two upstream firms and four downstream firms and find that exclusive territories may be more beneficial for consumers and more harmful for producers than...

In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in software markets. We show that network externality hinders collusion. We also show that firms collude if they value future profits sufficiently.

The domestic brand bias has been one of the most commonly used explanations for automobiles price differences across international borders in the EU. Using a panel dataset comprising of 51 models across 21 EU member states, we take advantage of cross country heterogeneity, and find that,...

The domestic brand bias has been one of the most commonly used explanations for automobiles price differences across international borders in the EU. Using a panel dataset comprising of 51 models across 21 EU member states, we take advantage of cross country heterogeneity, and find that,...

Melnik et al. [Melnik, A., Shy, Oz, Stenbacka, R. Assessing market dominance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 68, 63-72] have proposed a new statistic to assess market dominance. In this comment we expand their discussion of certain mathematical properties in their analysis and...

In this paper, we discuss the case of the integration between NSK and Amatsuji Steel Ball by using the successive oligopoly model. We show that the integration does not lead to input foreclosure. However, it leads to customer foreclosure, if the fixed cost of a rival firm in the upstream market...

In a supplementary note to Ghosh and Morita ("Social desirability of free entry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis," 2007, IJIO), an example has been used to show that the condition for insufficient entry holds under the right-to-manage model of a vertically related industry. Using a linear demand...

We develop a model of retail competition and negotiations with an upstream supplier for several firms of different sizes. Contrary to existing thinking, we demonstrate that the larger a buyer the less countervailing power he possesses over the supplier. The reason for this is that a buyer's...