In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in software markets. We show that network externality hinders collusion. We also show that firms collude if they value future profits sufficiently.

The unidirectional Hotelling model where consumers can buy only from firms located on their right (left) is extended to allow for price discriminating firms and a general class of transportation costs. In a two-stage location-price game one firm locates at 1/2 and the other locates at 1 (0). We...

This paper investigates the effects of exclusive territories in the presence of upstream competition. We consider the vertical dealings among two upstream firms and four downstream firms and find that exclusive territories may be more beneficial for consumers and more harmful for producers than...

This paper investigates the effects of exclusive territories in the presence of upstream competition. We consider the vertical dealings among two upstream firms and four downstream firms and find that exclusive territories may be more beneficial for consumers and more harmful for producers than...

Most of the literature on price discrimination in input markets has focused on linear per-unit prices used by a monopolist supplier. Here, we provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium two-part tariffs, which can allow the monopolist supplier to obtain (at a minimum) the profit that...

This note shows that the pro-competitive effect of pre-commitments is robust to Stackelberg-like market structures. Although our results are in line with Allaz and Vila (1993), the two equilibria differ substantially. Sequential interactions foster a monopolization of the contract market and a...

In this paper, we discuss the case of the integration between NSK and Amatsuji Steel Ball by using the successive oligopoly model. We show that the integration does not lead to input foreclosure. However, it leads to customer foreclosure, if the fixed cost of a rival firm in the upstream market...

In a supplementary note to Ghosh and Morita ("Social desirability of free entry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis," 2007, IJIO), an example has been used to show that the condition for insufficient entry holds under the right-to-manage model of a vertically related industry. Using a linear demand...

This note shows that the profitability of a merger between a leader and a follower in a Stackelberg market crucially depends on the degree of collusion among leaders. When leaders cut production in order to raise the price, followers have lower incentives to merge with the leaders since by...

Melnik et al. [Melnik, A., Shy, Oz, Stenbacka, R. Assessing market dominance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 68, 63-72] have proposed a new statistic to assess market dominance. In this comment we expand their discussion of certain mathematical properties in their analysis and...