We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures (b) the...

We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures (b) the...

An exchange economy with three equilibrium points is considered. The core of this economy is studied under replication. It is shown that the core splits into separate segments after 5 and then 12 replications and that convergences proceeds at different rates towards the three equilibria.

We show that a single-valued solution of non-atomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underlying them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result...

This note proposes a graphical approach useful in game theory. This method consists in representing incentives to move strategically to graphical areas. The method can be used on several occasions we apply it as an example to the model of Bouët (2001).

This note proposes a graphical approach useful in game theory. This method consists in representing incentives to move strategically to graphical areas. The method can be used on several occasions we apply it as an example to the model of Bouët (2001).

This paper uses dynamic games with complete and perfect information in solution of water conflict in Central Asia. The benefits and costs of the countries for their actions are modelled as payoffs for decision-makers within the frame of game theory concept. The equilibrium increasing the...

We show that, in a pure exchange smooth economy, a redistribution of endowments involving singular economies can be supported by a unique and continuous path of supporting equilibrium price vectors if this redistribution is the projection of a path on the equilibrium manifold transversal to the...