In this paper we solve a parametric moral hazard model that incorporates risk and inequity aversion. In the model, the worker's effort is not contractible but the employer can link the worker's compensation to the revenue, a measure probabilistically related to the effort. The model can account...

Using a moral hazard framework with limited liability with discrete effort levels we show that status incentives help in partially reducing the burden on monetary incentives. Yet, the disutility accruing from failure to achieve status dampens the efficiency of status as an incentive. The optimal...

In this paper we show that differential commodity taxation is superfluous in an economy with moral hazard and separable preferences.

In the research works, moral hazard is usually represented in two natural states (accident and no accident). In this case, the determination of the optimal contract could be made graphically. The mathematicaing is become more complicated when we consider infinite natural states and efforts under...

We extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case of moral hazard. We analyze the equilibrium properties of the model and we show that equal ex-ante consumers may choose to promise differently, and, as a consequence, choose different actions. This illustrates how the pool of...

Career concerns can mitigate moral hazard problems, but these diminish as the agent's retirement age approaches. Addressing this problem, this note draws attention to the role of the interaction between contractible and non-contractible signals.

Multiple empirical studies find that juries/courts take account of potential harm in the determination of punitive damages. The received view in economic theory, however, is that punitive damages should not depend on potential harm. The purpose of this note is to provide an efficiency rationale...

It has been generally accepted for unilateral-care models that care incentives are not affected by the use of either accurate damages or average damages if injurers lack knowledge of the precise damage level they might cause. This paper shows that in bilateral-care models with heterogeneous...

It has been generally accepted for unilateral-care models that care incentives are not affected by the use of either accurate damages or average damages if injurers lack knowledge of the precise damage level they might cause. This paper shows that in bilateral-care models with heterogeneous...

We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good while polluting. This firm can adopt a cleaner technology within a finite time by incurring an investment cost decreasing exponentially with the adoption date. The firm is induced to adopt the cleaner technology at the socially optimal date by an...