We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good while polluting. This firm can adopt a cleaner technology within a finite time by incurring an investment cost decreasing exponentially with the adoption date. The firm is induced to adopt the cleaner technology at the socially optimal date by an...

This paper proposes an alternative to standard cardinal tournaments. The analysis contrasts "hybrid" cardinal tournaments to standard cardinal tournaments and piece rates. It shows that providing for partial insurance against common uncertainty via a hybrid tournament (in which the weights on...

We adapt a genetic-based learning classifier system to a forecast evaluation exercise by making its key parameters endogenous and taking into account the need of convergence of the learning algorithm, an issue usually neglected in the literature. Doing so, we find it hard for the algorithm to...

This note shows that there exists a threshold level of optimal prevention for a risk neutral agent which separates cases where a risk averse agent exerts less effort in prevention than a risk neutral agent and cases where she exerts more effort. We also show that the risk averse agent makes...

This paper proposes a novel method of global optimization based on host-parasite co-evolution. It also develops a Fortran-77 code for the algorithm. The algorithm has been tested on 100 benchmark functions (of which the results of 32 relatively harder problems have been reported). In its search...

According to an early approach, the decision to trust in the one-shot anonymous trust game is intuitively tantamount to a risky decision: the willingness to bet on the reciprocation of my investment. In a seminal study, Eckel and Wilson (2004) explored the correlation between risk attitudes (as...

We correct an analysis by Isik (2004) regarding the effects of uncertainty on the WTA-WTP gap. Isik presents as his primary result a proposition that the introduction of uncertainty regarding environmental quality improvements causes WTA to increase and WTP to decrease by identical amounts...

This paper analyzes the value of menus of contracts in a context of delegated expertise with nondelegated decision making. Firms delegate to managers the task of obtaining information about strategic decisions, and they choose whether or not to delegate the actual decision-making process to...

In a team production problem with unverifiable effort, budget breaking is essential to implementing efficient levels of effort. This short paper considers the use of a third party, who does not exert effort, in a setting with general contracts that can include message games, as a way to remove...

I analyze a two-period advice game in which the decision maker chooses to retain or replace the advisor after the first period. The potential replacement creates career concerns for the advisor and thus creates incentives to misinform the decision maker. When the career concern is sufficiently...