This paper suggests a new procedure for separating the market-power effect from the efficiency effect when cost data are not available. We examine a panel of data on 177 mobile-voice operators in 45 countries from 1999:1 to 2004:2 and find that a 1% increase in the market share of an operator...

This paper constructs an entry and code-sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the...

This paper constructs an entry and code-sharing alliances game to demonstrate that the alliance between the incumbent carriers may play a significant role of entry deterrence in a given airline network. We show that incumbents can use the alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of the...

This paper provides estimates of the elasticities of demand for the Brazilian basic plan of local fixed telephony using a cointegration model. We find a long-run price elasticity of –0.24, and an income elasticity of 0.18. These figures are line with other countries' estimates.

Kang, Weisman, and Zhang (2000) demonstrated that, under a tighter price cap, consumer welfare increases with the independence of demands. Conversely, the tighter price cap may negatively impact consumer welfare in situations involving interdependent demands. This paper identifies an overlooked...

I derive Ramsey optimal prices in one-way access of long-distance operators and enhanced service providers to local loops. As long-distance services and enhanced services become substitutes due to the advance of Internet telephony, the Ramsey principle requires higher access charges assessed on...

This paper provides estimates of the elasticities of demand for the Brazilian basic plan of local fixed telephony using a cointegration model. We find a long-run price elasticity of –0.24, and an income elasticity of 0.18. These figures are line with other countries' estimates.