We consider an exchange economy with an atomless space of consumers whose preference relations need not be monotone. We prove that if for every commodity, there is a group of consumers who regard it as potentially desirable, in a sense to be made precise, then there exists a competitive...

The article analyzes the Dynkin (1975) stochastic model of economic equilibrium. We solve a question regarding this model that was open for a long time. We provide arguments yielding a complete proof of Dynkin's existence theorem for equilibrium paths.

The strong Whitney topology on the sets of maps of smooth manifolds induces a topology on the set of preferences in euclidean space. We prove that the obtained space is not connected which implies that there is no continuous social choice function defined on a finite power of this space. We also...

In the framework of economics models with unbounded short sales a number of different conditions limiting arbitrage opportunities have been introduced. Dana, Le Van and Magnien [JET.87(1999)169] appeal to the condition of compactness of the individually rational utility set and show that all...

In this note we consider a general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition between firms who ignore the feedback effect of their dividend payments on demand. The outcome of this competition coincides with the perfectly competitive equilibrium solution, provided that firms have identical...

In this paper we analyze, from the Negishi approach the concepts of structurally stable and structurally unstable economies on Banach's spaces. With this purpose we formalize the intuitive concept of similar economies. We show that in certain cases similar (or neighboring) economies can show no...

We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures (b) the...

We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures (b) the...

In this note, we introduce conjectural variations in a simple general oligopoly equilibrium model of a pure exchange economy. Three results are obtained. First, the price and utility levels generally increase with the value taken by conjectures. Second, when the conjectural variation takes its...

It is well-known that in the static Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets, extrinsic uncertainty cannot matter. This paper re-examines this result when agents preferences exhibit aversion to Knightian uncertainty. We then show that extrinsic uncertainty still cannot matter.