We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a two-stage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.

We study a loan market equilibrium in which some borrowers are optimistic and banks face imperfect competition. We show that the presence of optimistic borrowers reduces the interest rate paid by safe borrowers and increases the interest rate paid by risky borrowers. But it has no net impact on...

This paper analyzes an Easley and O'Hara (1992) type sequential trading model in an evolutionary setting. We assume that the memory of a market maker is limited, and that traders endogenously choose whether to acquire private information with a fixed cost. We show that the ratio of the informed...

In this note, we consider a multisector macroeconomic model under oligopolistic competition. We analyze the effect of an increase of the number of sectors on equilibrium price and on allocations, when the number of oligopolits of each type is constant. We also show that a tax policy has more...

In this note, we examine how trade liberalization affects the profits of firms in the presence of network effects. We will show that, contrary to conclusions in the previous literature, trade liberalization between identical countries increases firms' profits despite intesified competition.

Though government intervention is prevalent in the market for research and development (R&D), most literature has focused on the use of subsidies, patents or joint research ventures to obtain the efficient R&D investment. By using a two-stage duopoly model in which firms first choose the level...

A simple common value auction is considered where it is optimal to set a ceiling price in addition to a reserve price. The ceiling price prevents the better informed bidder from outbidding the less informed bidders. This guarantees participation from the less informed bidders raising the...

In this article, we extend the conditional ICAPM of De Santis and Gérard (1997,1998) using an asymmetric multivariate GARCH specification. This approach, with double asymmetric effects, allows to the risk premia, betas and correlations to vary through time. Then, we investigate ex ante benefits...

A Cournot oligopoly with at least three firms is considered, where one of the firms has a cost-reducing innovation. A general version of royalty contract is proposed, and it is shown that this contract enables the innovator firm to earn the monopoly profit with the reduced cost.

This paper examines the equilibrium incentive for firms to use behavior-based price discrimination in a duopoly market with exogenous switching costs. We find that if there is a large difference in the existing market shares between two firms, then discriminatory pricing is a unique Nash...