This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...

A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...

I examine a search model a la' Burdett and Judd (1983). Consumers are embedded in a consumers network, they may costly search for price quotations and the information gathered are non-excludable along direct links. This allows me to explore the effect of endogenous consumers externalities on...

I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I first show that values and costs asymmetries are crucial in determining the level of connectedness of a network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are...

We analyze the impact of adolescents' friendship relations in their final-year class of highschool on subsequent labor market success. Based on a typology of network positions we locateeach student within the social system of the school class as either: an isolate, a sycophant,a broker or a...

We present a strategic game of pricing and targeted-advertising. Firms cansimultaneously target priceadvertisements to different groups of customers, or to the entiremarket. Pure strategy equilibria do not exist and thus marketsegmentation cannot occur surely. Equilibria exhibit random...

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all...

This paper studies a connections model of network formation in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the cost of forming links. We start by showing that value heterogeneity is important in determining the level of connectedness of a network, while cost heterogeneity...

We study an incomplete-information model of sequential bargaining for a single object, with the novel feature that agents are located in a network. In each round of trade, the current owner of the object either consumes it or makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to some connected trader. Traders...