We apply the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to a two-player tournament incentive scheme. Our treatments vary the prize spread. The data highlights that honesty is more pronounced when the prize spread is small.

This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...

In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies.

This paper proposes an extension of the valuation equilibrium concept (Jehiel and Samet, 2007), which partly endogenises the underlying grouping of actions. The effect on equilibrium predictions is illustrated in a burning money game.

In this paper, we show that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and even lead to an advantage in absolute terms.