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The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
Park, Sangwon - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 326-330
The objective of a leniency program is to reduce sanctions against collusion if a participant voluntarily confesses his … the collusion amount; furthermore, he presented a sufficient condition under which the maximum leniency is optimal. After … extending the model by endogenizing the degree of collusion as well as equilibrium selection in the self-reporting stage, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743731
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Competition and collusion with fixed output
Zenger, Hans - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 259-261
between different markets. This paper shows that collusion in such industries leads firms to shift output from high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678818
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Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 2, pp. 223-225
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076534
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Clustered bids in first-price auctions : collusion or competition?
Leverano, Adriano de - In: Economics letters 233 (2023), pp. 1-4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014506238
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Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly
Hu, Luke - 2012
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333722
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Horizontal mergers with synergies: first-price vs. profit-share auction
Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2010
of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333759
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Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates
Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2006
We consider the procurement of a complex, indivisible good when bid preparation is costly, assuming a population of heterogeneous contractors. Shortlisting is introduced to implement the optimal number of bidders, and we explore whether the procurer should reimburse the nonrecoverable cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333774
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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers
Giebe, Thomas; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2007
profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333797
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Subsidies, Knapsack Auctions and Dantzig's Greedy Heuristic
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2009
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333849
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Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers' Bids Determine Royalty Rates
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2009
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333873