I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.

An increase in the taxation of foreign affiliates reduces domestic investment, as has recently been empirically shown in Becker and Riedel (2012). This paper investigates the implication of this finding for tax competition. It is shown that an increase in the number of multinational firms (in...

In standard discrete choice models, adding options cannot increase the choice probability of an existing alternative. We use this observation to construct a simple nonparametric specification test by exploiting variation in the choice sets individuals face. We use a multiple testing procedure to...

We explore the relationship between personal characteristics and the decision to lie to an anonymous partner in a cheap talk environment. We find that sex, age, grade point average, student debt, size of return, socioeconomic status, and average time spent in religious observation are not...

In this note I present a novel finding on the relationship between education and religion in the US. I estimate the effect of education on religiosity using two alternative data sources and complementary identification strategies. My findings are conclusive. Contrary to the previously...

Art is often used as an investment vehicle. Given the importance of market efficiency in finance, we use a large auction-based index to test whether the art market is weakly efficient. Evidence reveals that returns on artworks exhibit high positive auto-correlation. We attribute this result to...

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Trendsetters wish to be perceived as the type that defines normative behavior. Incorporating norm formation in Bernheim (1994)’s model yields equilibria with social considerations concentrating behavior, allowing multiple conformist pools. Refinements link each pooling equilibrium to a unique...

Some problems are more easily solved if context is provided. A stylized result from beauty contest experiments is that most choices are consistent with level-1 or level-2 thinking rather than the Nash equilibrium. The beauty contest experiment reported in this paper includes treatments in which...

We consider a differential game with a corrupt government and civil society as its players. We characterize open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria and find that, whereas it is in the best interest of the government not to commit to a repression policy, civil society is better off precommitting...