I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property. We also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game.

This article examines the effects of a tax on vacant dwellings. I use a search equilibrium model in which the distribution of rent is the result of the owners’ posting strategy. I show that this tax reduces the number of vacant dwellings and increases the average rent.

This paper shows that grid-based numerical solutions to models with incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty are sensitive to the number and placement of grid points in the aggregate asset holdings direction. Higher moments of the cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings can be...

We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the...

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts.

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most...

This paper investigates the two-sided many-to-many matching problem, where every agent has max–min preference. The equivalence between the pairwise-stability and the setwise-stability is obtained. It is shown that the pairwise-stability implies the strong corewise-stability and the former may...

In this paper, we make use of a unique dataset collected at the central train station of the city of Kiel, Germany. Group tickets are used by individual proposers looking for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The shared ride is offered for a fixed price. We...

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that...