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Labour union, entry and consumer welfare

Mukherjee, Arijit; Wang, Leonard F.S. - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 3, pp. 603-605

for entry and may also make consumers better off compared to the situation with no labour union if the labour productivity … of the entrant is sufficiently higher to that of the incumbent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681771

Existence of free entry equilibrium in aggregative games with asymmetric agents

Okumura, Yasunori - In: Economics Letters 127 (2015) C, pp. 14-16

In this paper, we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric. We show the existence of a pure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189517

Technology licensing and innovation

Mukherjee, Arijit; Mukherjee, Soma - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 3, pp. 499-502

We show that under a fixed-fee licensing contract if the licenser and the licensee bargain over the licensing fee …, licensing decreases (increases) innovation by decreasing (increasing) the strategic (non-strategic) benefit from innovation …. However, licensing increases innovation under a two-part tariff licensing contract. Licensing does not reduce social welfare. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681747

Bundled discounts: Strategic substitutes or complements?

Brito, Duarte; Vasconcelos, Helder - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 2, pp. 278-282

Bundled discounts by pairs of otherwise independent firms play an increasingly important role as a strategic tool in several industries. Given that prices of firms competing for the same consumers are strategic complements, one would expect their discounts levels also to be strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933297

Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control

Jovanovic, Dragan; Wey, Christian - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 1, pp. 32-35

We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities ignoring the effects of previous PPO acquisitions invite sneaky takeovers: a PPO is strategically used prior to a full takeover to get a merger approved which is in fact detrimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939488

Mixed pricing in oligopoly with limited monopoly

Wen, Zhong - In: Economics Letters 125 (2014) 1, pp. 87-92

We analyze price competition between two brands. Buyers consist of switchers and two segments of customers with limited brand loyalty. We identify a unique symmetric mixed-strategy price equilibrium and find that competition is most relaxed when there exists some switchers.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939501

Cost pass-through and inverse demand curvature in vertical relationships with upstream and downstream competition

Adachi, Takanori; Ebina, Takeshi - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 3, pp. 465-468

This paper provides two characterizations of the retailer’s markup relative to the manufacturer’s markup in vertical relationships with homogeneous manufacturers and homogeneous retailers. We first show that retailer’s relative markup is equal to the ratio of the retail pass-through to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930731

Content provision and compatibility in a platform market

Rasch, Alexander; Wenzel, Tobias - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 3, pp. 478-481

This paper studies the ambiguous welfare effects of compatibility in a platform market with endogenous content provision. Compatibility can be particularly harmful if it leads to reduced content but can be beneficial if content is sufficiently increased.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930733

Application compatibility and affiliation in two-sided markets

Maruyama, Masayoshi; Zennyo, Yusuke - In: Economics Letters 130 (2015) C, pp. 39-42

This paper analyzes the unilateral choices of application compatibility by platforms and the endogenous affiliations of two different groups (content providers and users). We find a novel result that for both platforms to unilaterally choose application compatibility is not an equilibrium unless...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263393

Introducing consumer heterogeneity in dynamic games with multi-product firms and differentiated product demand

Macieira, João - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 62-65

This paper extends a discrete-choice model of differentiated product demand to consider consumer heterogeneity in dynamic games. Our approach applies to games involving both multi-product firms and static price competition.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263409