for entry and may also make consumers better off compared to the situation with no labour union if the labour productivity … of the entrant is sufficiently higher to that of the incumbent. …

In this paper, we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric. We show the existence of a pure …

We show that under a fixed-fee licensing contract if the licenser and the licensee bargain over the licensing fee …, licensing decreases (increases) innovation by decreasing (increasing) the strategic (non-strategic) benefit from innovation …. However, licensing increases innovation under a two-part tariff licensing contract. Licensing does not reduce social welfare. …

We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his … patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses …

We show that the entry of private profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off compared to having a … nationalised monopoly. Such entry increases the nationalised firm’s profit, industry profit, and social welfare, at the expense of …