Providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky. One simple method is a high score (as in computer games). We test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences.

We describe an ambiguity hedging problem in Ellsberg experiments, where combinations of individually ambiguous bets eliminate aggregate ambiguity, and which may yield incorrect classifications of ambiguity averse subjects. We propose a new classification consistent with this hedging possibility.

In this paper we examine the strategic savviness of the medieval church as portrayed in Richard Wagner's Tannhäuser. We show that the church employed an optimal randomization strategy based on arguments of dominance or trembling-hand perfection. Particular attention is paid to the employed...

We examine the role of consumer networks in markets that suffer from moral hazard. Consumers exchange information with neighbors about past experiences with different sellers. Networks foster incentives for reputation building and enhance trust and efficiency in markets.