We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical merger with a monopoly upstream will induce each downstream firm (inside and out of the merger) to deviate from the socially optimal location.

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.

We look at the implications of a cross-border merger upstream in a vertically related industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

We construct a game theoretic model of an oligarchic economy that potentially could be targeted by smart international sanctions. Oligarchs in this economy provide support for their leader, a strong man and potentially an autocrat, in return for favors that results in having income higher than...

We show that wage behavior as well as the skilled-unskilled wage gap depend on elasticity of import demand. Although, our analysis is in the spirit of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, factor intensity plays no role in our results.

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of pollution and study in a holistic way the environmental policies, whereby government sets up emission caps and sells emission permits at a competitive price which can be viewed as an emission tax. Then, it uses the collected tax revenues to...